I
In its judgment, rendered on December 22, 1947, in the case of Friedrich Flick et al., count 3, the U.S.A. Military Tribunal of Nurnberg, court 4, quotes the definition of crime against humanity, formulated by the VIIIth Conference for the Unification of Penal Law, to support its own restrictive conception of the crime. We cannot approve the Tribunal's interpretation. We believe the court was not exactly informed as to the aim, the meaning and the extent of that definition.
In order to make our position clear, we briefly summarize the case. The defendant Flick was charged with crime against humanity because, previously to the war, he acquired through sales, some of the industrial property owned by Jews, who were expropriated by general governmental decree, dated December 3, 1938.
The Court states first that the fact-if a crime-is not a warcrime, because it was committed before the war and wholly unconnected with the war. It thus makes a finding of lack of jurisdiction, based not only on Law 10 of December 20, 1945, but also on the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943 , and the London Agreement of August 8, which constitute, taken together, its chartering legislation.
And the Court adds: "Under these circumstances, we make the following statements on the merits relating to this count, (crime against humanity) with full appreciation that statements as to the merits are pure dicta where a finding of lack of jurisdiction is also made." Introduced in this way, the discussion is purely theoretical and cannot have the slightest influence on the authority of the sentence.
The question was to know whether deprivation of property on racial grounds was a crime against humanity. The answer of the Court is "no": "We believe that the proof does not establish a crime against humanity, recognized as such by the Law of Nations, when defendants were engaged in the property transactions here under scrutiny."
We cannot but agree with the Court. When the accused acted, unlawful deprivation of property, on racial or religious grounds, was not a crime against humanity because-prior" to the Charter-no Law of nations did qualify it as such-nor did it qualify any deed as such.
To support its opinion, the Tribunal quotes an article: "The Judgment of Nurnberg and the Principle of Legality of Offenses and Penalties" by Professor Donnedieu de Vabres, the eminent penalist and French member of the I.M.T., in which he expresses the view that: "The theory of crimes against humanity is dangerous; dangerous for the peoples by the absence of precise definition; dangerous for the States because it offers a pretext to intervention by a State, in the internal affairs of weaker States."I And, indeed, in the trial of the major war-criminals, crimes against humanity were held to have been committed "only when the proof also fully established the commission of war crimes."1 2
II
But the Court also quotes the definition adopted by the VIllth Conference, and, there, it was obviously misinformed.
In fact, the definition quoted by the Court is but an excerpt of the resolution adopted by the Conference which was never published, but as a whole 3 and which ought to be interpreted as such.
Here is the translation of that resolution in its integral, original text: 1 Whereas, on the one hand, respect of the rights and the dignity of the human person is the very foundation of civilization;
Whereas protection of those rights and that dignity against any unlawful infringement has been progressively organized in the internal legislations which punish those infringements as offenses;
Whereas a tribute must be paid to the national legislators who endeavoured to secure that protection by the provisions of the positive law or by national drafts; 
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Whereas, owing to the general evolution of Law and of the social relation and to the nature of those offenses, it is not only desirable but necessary that this protection should be organized on an international scale;
Whereas it is especially necessary to protect against any offense the cause of which is race, nationality, religion or opinions, the rights of man of which protection is granted by the internal law or which, for the future, will be determined by the competent international bodies; 2 Whereas, on the other hand, until a law is passed which will punish as an offense against humanity any infringement of the fundamental rights of man, especially the rights to life, health, corporal integrity and freedom, it is necessary to yield to the imperative wish of the universal conscience, to secure, from this very moment, the repression of manslaughter and any deed the result of which is subversion of human life, either committed against individuals, against human groups, because of their race, their nationality, their religion or their opinions;
Whereas the repression ought to be organized on an international scale and secured by an international Tribunal, when the accused are rulers, agents or protegees of the State and also in the absence of repression by the internal repressive law;
The EIGHTH CONFERENCE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PENAL LAW:
RECOMMENDS: establishment as an offense sui generis against common law and inclusion in the international penal Code and in all the internal repressive Codes, from this moment and at the least, of a provision to punish the deeds related to in the following text:
Any The Conference Expresses the Wish: That the States should punish propaganda aiming at commission of crimes against humanity.
I
When the U.S.A. Military Tribunal, in its opinion, limits the quotation to the definition which we emphasized and adds: "But from the report of the proceedings, this seems to have been the extent of agreement," it makes an obvious error, because agreement was reached not only on the definition but on the resolution as a whole.
And indeed, the preamble cannot be separated from the definition. Both were discussed at once. Drafted by a small committee, of which the author was a member, to express the views of a large majority in the second symposium, it was successively adopted by the symposium itself and by the general assembly, L Vol. 40 CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY after a thorough debate, the report of which is to be found in the Acts.
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. Even taken alone, the definition has no restrictive sense whatsoever, because it is not a definition of the crime against humanity, but of a crime against humanity. Genocide is also a crime against humanity and the wickedest of all, but who could assert that a definition of genocide could be restrictive, with regard to the conception of crime against humanity?
From the preamble and from the discussion, it is clear beyond any doubt, that the limiting definition, the advocates of which were Mr. Boissarie, Pfr. Pella and Pfr. Rollin, president of the Belgian senate, was passed but a minimo and based only on opportunity and sense of possibility. The definition could support and broaden altogether the bill on genocide which was, at the time, to be put to the general assembly of the U.N.O.
It is clear also that a large majority of the Conference supported a much broader conception, which is to be found in the first sentence of the second part of the preamble. Crime against humanity is "any infringement of the fundamental rights of man, committed against individuals, or against groups of individuals, because of their race, their nationality, or their opinions." And referring to the second sentence, we may add: "by abuse of the sovereign authority of the State."
The reports for the Holy See (Pfr. Bondue), for Luxemburg (quoting Mr. Aroneanu), for Poland (Air. Sawicki), for France (Mr. Herzog), for Switzerland (Pfr. Graven), for the Netherlands (Pfr. Pompe and Mr. Kazemier) and the general report itself were much in favor of a broad conception of the crime and the statements of these jurists, during the debate, cannot but reinforce that conclusion.
We must confess that, at the time, the aforesaid definition was but of slight value because of the absence of an effective universal declaration of human rights. But since the international bill of the rights of man was passed by the general assembly of the U.N.O., at Paris, in the night of December 10, 1948, an important step was made toward an inclusive and adequate definition of the crime against humanity. And indeed, there is between human rights and crime against humanity a direct bond already emphasized by most of the members of the VI~th Conference, the full extent of which jurists may now realize and formulate.
The right to property being recognized by Article 17 of the
